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EFN REPORT 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA IN 2007 and 2008 
Highlights 
• The turmoil on financial markets has distinctly clouded the outlook for 
worldwide growth; present risk spreads will probably not shrink by much over 
the forecasting horizon, and worldwide financial conditions will be less benign 
than those during the past few. 
• In the euro area, production will converge to its potential growth path in autumn, 
mainly because the investment upswing is coming to an end soon. Consumption 
will partly fill the gap, as confidence in job security has greatly increased.  
• A major downside risk for the euro area is that housing markets will weaken 
where they have been booming for years, particularly in Spain and in Ireland. 
The fear is that rising interest rates might trigger a downturn. In addition, a loss 
of confidence in mortgage related securities as a result of the events in the US 
could aggravate financial conditions for European housing markets. 
• In line with the forecasts coming from National Accounts, the updated forecasts 
for the Economic Sentiment Indicator point to a gradual fall of confidence in the 
economy’s evolution until the second quarter of 2008, subsequently tending to 
stabilise at levels still high and similar to those observed in mid-2006. 
• Inflation forecasts have been revised upwards from the last report, to 2.0% in 
2007 and 2.2% in 2008. Practically all basic HICP components contribute to this 
upwards revision, except non energy industrial goods and services in 2008. It is 
worth mentioning the upwards revision in forecasts experienced by processed 
food prices in the last month. 
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Table 1 Economic outlook for the Euro area 
  2004 2005 2006 2007: 2nd half 2007: annual 2008: annual
    
Point 
Forecast
Interval 
Forecast
Point 
Forecast
Interval 
Forecast
Point 
Forecast
Interval 
Forecast
1.8 2.3 1.1
GDP 2.0 1.5 2.8 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.7 1.9 2.5
1.6 1.6 1.8
Potential Output 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2
1.4 1.4 1.7
Private Consumption 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.4 3.0
1.2 1.6 1.1
Government Consumption 1.3 1.3 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.8
1.9 3.8 -0.4
Fixed Capital Formation 2.3 2.6 5.0 3.3 4.7 4.5 5.2 1.8 3.8
3.8 5.1 3.5
Exports 6.9 4.3 8.0 4.8 5.8 5.6 6.1 4.4 5.4
3.4 4.4 3.5
Imports 6.7 5.1 7.7 4.4 5.5 5.0 5.5 4.7 6.0
6.6 6.9 6.3
Unemployment Rate 8.8 8.6 7.9 6.8 7.0 7.0 7.1 6.7 7.1
2.2 2.2 2.6
Labour Cost Index 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.4 3.0 3.3
0.5 1.0 -0.1
Labour Productivity 0.9 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.4 0.5 1.1
2.1 1.9 1.8
HICP 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.6
2.9 3.0 1.4
IPI 
2.1 1.3 4.0 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.6 2.5 3.6
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for the unemployment 
rate. Point forecasts and 80% confidence bounds are taken from EFN forecasting model and based on 2000 stochastic 
simulations.  
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Economic Outlook for 2007 and 2008  
 
The world economy and the financial turmoil   
The turmoil on financial markets has distinctly clouded the outlook for worldwide 
growth. News from the real economy had been mixed until recently, showing that pro-
duction in early summer had stopped expanding in Japan, but continued its swift pace in 
China and rebounded in the US. Since June, however, rising numbers of mortgage de-
linquencies, in particular in the subprime sector, have led to drastic devaluations of se-
curities backed by US mortgages; some of those relatively new and sophisticated assets 
are at present not tradable at all. Strikingly, these problems have spread quickly from 
the US to other financial markets and from securities backed by mortgages to asset 
backed securities in general. What aggravates the strains on financial markets is that 
quite a few institutions holding these longer term assets are refinanced by short term 
instruments; falling or non-existent market values of their assets have driven them into  
liquidity shortages. As a consequence, interest rates on interbank money markets, in 
particular with maturity of three months, have leapt far above key interest rates in the 
US, in the euro area, and in Britain. Central banks intervened by injecting liquidity 
(ECB and Fed), lowering the rate for the discount window (Fed), or by extending a 
credit line to an endangered institution (the Bank of England for the mortgage bank 
Northern Rock); all these measures appear to have, up to now, only temporary success. 
Risk spreads for bonds have increased distinctly in all industrial countries and, to vary-
ing degrees, for all sorts of risk. The flight to safety has induced stock market evalua-
tions to fall, albeit just modestly in the US.  
In assessing the real effects of the financial crisis, it has been argued that the US sub-
prime sector is too small to jeopardize the solvency of financial institutions on a scale 
that would be large enough to dampen the world economy significantly. From this per-
spective, the liquidity shortage is a consequence of uncertainties about where the –  rela-
tively few – bad risks will be found: banks refrain from lending to each other because of 
counterparty risk. But such a view might be too complacent for two reasons: the first is 
the effect of the crisis on the housing markets in the US. Prices will further be dragged 
down because demand from the subprime sector is disappearing. Construction will con-
tinue to contract, and household consumption will slow even more due to significant 
negative housing wealth effects. Weaker US demand will affect all important regions in 
the world.  
There is a second reason for expecting a notable dampening of the world economy: the 
crisis appears to be one of confidence in the very nature of the new financial instru-
ments. Evidence for such an interpretation is the fact that valuations of these instru-
ments suffered, whether they were related to housing or not. Their main weakness fol-
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lows directly from their ability to diversify risks more efficiently: as the EFN summer 
forecast in June (before the outbreak of the crisis) argued, “markets might have diversi-
fied risk to such a degree that in the end no investor is willing to shoulder monitoring 
costs.” Because investors now appear to hold similar views, the present risk spreads will 
probably not shrink by much over the forecasting horizon and worldwide financial con-
ditions will be less benign than those of the past few years. The US central bank will 
lower its target rate, but its room for manoeuvre is limited by a still uncomfortably high 
core inflation rate. All in all, we expect for the second half of 2007 that the US economy 
will further slow down, but avoid recession, and that the upswing of the world economy 
will come to an end, but, thanks to high growth dynamics in the emerging markets 
countries, continue to expand markedly. 
Risks appear particularly high for this forecast. An upward risk is that the financial cri-
sis will calm down faster than expected, possibly, because public investors from emerg-
ing market countries could shift their focus a bit from government bonds to private as-
sets and thus help stabilizing financial markets. A main downward risk is, of course, 
that the downturn of the US housing market might be more pronounced than expected 
here. Other risk factors are, as so often in the recent past, the weak dollar (at a record 
low relative to the euro in September) and high oil prices (at an all time high this month 
in dollar terms).  
 
The euro area 
In early summer, euro area production expanded with an annualized rate of 1.4 %, only 
half as fast as at the beginning of the year. Export growth was still strong, although dy-
namics have clearly abated from the export boom of 2006. Imports expanded at a lower 
rate. This was due to sluggish domestic demand: consumption of private households 
rebounded only modestly from the stagnation of the first quarter; the value added tax 
increase appears to still dampen consumption in Germany. Investment even contracted 
slightly. This, however, is largely the result of the unusually mild weather at the begin-
ning of the year that had pushed construction activity temporarily. Investment in equip-
ment has continued to expand briskly. 
Industrial production kept its healthy pace during the summer, but capital utilization 
seems to have slided a bit recently, albeit from very high levels. Similarly, confidence 
of firms (with the exception of retailers) was somewhat declining in the past months, 
but still strong in August. The real cost of non-financial corporations’ external financing 
had been increasing during early summer, mainly due to rising interest rates, and have 
certainly increased markedly with the recent trumoils on financial markets. Banks have, 
at present, a preference for keeping liquidity instead of expanding credit, risk spreads 
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have increased to levels last observed in the year 2003, and losses on stock markets 
have made equity financing more expensive. Other forces behind the strong investment 
growth during the past quarters are for now intact: wage growth is still modest, profits 
are high and seem even to be further increasing. But wages will – though not dramati-
cally – accelerate due to tighter labour markets, and profits will be squeezed by higher 
costs for capital, labour, and energy. Thus, the investment upswing is probably coming 
to an end this autumn, distinctly earlier than forecast in the EFN summer report. Con-
sumption will partly fill the gap, mainly because confidence in job security has greatly 
increased; indeed, employment expands healthily and the unemployment rate is, with 
6.4 % (July), at its lowest since the euro area was established. Employment growth ap-
pears, however, also to have passed its peak. Export growth will be dampened by weak 
demand from the US and this summer’s appreciation of the euro, while demand from 
emerging markets countries will be supportive. Policy will exert little influence: the 
ECB can be expected to take measures, like the injection of liquidity, that prevent major 
malfunctions of financial markets. Beyond this, avoiding the interest rate increase that 
the bank had signaled before the turmoil began appears to be at the limit of what the 
ECB regards as compatible with its focus on price stability. Fiscal policy is restrictive 
this year, but will be slightly accommodative in 2008 due to tax cuts in France and, 
probably, a cut in social security contributions in Germany. 
All in all, production will converge to its potential growth path in autumn. The major 
downside risk for the euro area – alongside those for the world economy as a whole – is 
that housing markets will weaken where they have been booming for years, particularly 
in Spain and in Ireland. Until recently, the fear was that rising interest rates might trig-
ger a downturn: house price growth is moderating in many countries, and the expansion 
of mortgage lending has declined considerably in the first half of the year. Confidence 
in the construction industry is, according to the European Commission’s survey, wan-
ing, albeit mostly from high levels. Now an additional risk has emerged: a loss of confi-
dence in mortgage related securities as a result of the events in the US could aggravate 
financial conditions for European housing markets. This risk is, however, limited by the 
fact that European residential mortgage-backed securities have – at least up to now – 
very high ratings.   
Overall, we expect a GDP growth of 2.5% in 2007 and 1.9% in 2008 in the euro area. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the quarterly GDP growth rate, and the uncertainty 
about it. Figure 2 reports the contribution of domestic components and net exports to 
GDP growth.  
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Figure 1  Quarterly GDP growth rates and confidence bands 
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Figure 2 Contributions of domestic components and net exports to GDP growth 
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Figure 3 Euro Area Economic Sentiment Indicator 
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The Euro Area Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) complements the information 
coming from the Quarterly National Accounts, offering figures for the beginning of the 
third quarter. The latest available figures correspond to August 2007. As Figure 3 
shows, in the last three months this indicator has started to decline, registering worse 
than expected figures in June, July and August. The decline in August was due to a 
falling confidence of economic agents in the construction, services and consumer goods 
sectors. In line with the perspectives coming from the National Accounts, which 
announce lower growth for 2008, the forecasts for this indicator point to a gradual fall 
of confidence in the economy’s evolution until the second quarter of 2008, subsequently 
tending to stabilise at levels still high and similar to those observed in mid-2006. 
 
Analysing GDP growth forecasts from a supply-side perspective, Table 2 shows that 
industrial and market services will account for most of the drop in GDP growth in 2007. 
The difference between 2006’s growth and 2008’s expected growth, almost 1 
percentage point, would be the result of a lower contribution in 2008 from the industry, 
construction and market services sectors. The first one would show in 2008 a 
contribution half the one it had in 2006, the construction sector would reduce its 
contribution to almost 0% and market services’ contribution would be one third below 
its contribution in 2006. 
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Table 2  Contributions of production sectors 
     Services  
Year GDP Growth Agriculture Industrial Construction Market Financial Public Net taxes 
2003 0.80% -0.13% 0.05% 0.00% 0.13% 0.39% 0.18% 0.18% 
2004 2.00% 0.24% 0.37% 0.04% 0.47% 0.38% 0.33% 0.17% 
2005 1.50% -0.11% 0.17% 0.07% 0.31% 0.64% 0.27% 0.15% 
2006 2.80% -0.03% 0.70% 0.25% 0.55% 0.74% 0.25% 0.35% 
2007 2.50% 0.03% 0.59% 0.17% 0.45% 0.78% 0.25% 0.24% 
2008 1.90% 0.01% 0.34% 0.03% 0.39% 0.69% 0.25% 0.21% 
 
In line with a lower contribution to GDP growth from the industrial sector, forecasts for 
the Industrial Production Index (IPI) point to a progressive decrease in the average 
annual growth rate from 4.0% in 2006 to an expected 2.5% in 2008. These forecasts 
have been revised upwards since our last report, taking into account the better than 
expected figures registered in two of the last three months in the IPI and the Industrial 
Confidence Indicator (ICI). The latest figures for the IPI correspond to July, when it 
grew more than expected as the result of upwards innovations in practically all 
productive sectors. The latest figures for the ICI correspond to August, and the updated 
forecasts point to a gradual fall in the confidence of economic agents in the industrial 
sector’s evolution in 2007 and 2008, tending to stabilise in the last quarter of next year 
at values which, although lower than those observed since the second quarter of 2006, 
are clearly higher than those found in years when the sector experienced a low growth 
rate. 
 
Table 3 reports the average annual rates of growth in the euro area Industrial Production 
Index for different industries classified according to the destination of goods. It shows 
that all sectors but non durable goods will contribute to the expected decrease between 
2006 and 2007 in the annual IPI growth rate. In 2008, it will be energy the only sector 
that will not contribute to the expected further slowdown. 
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Table 3  Annual average rates for industrial production in the euro area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Capital -1.4% -0.1% 3.4%  2.8% 5.8%  5.5% 3.8% 
Durable -5.9% -4.4% 0.1% -1.0% 4.2%  2.1% 1.2% 
Intermediate -0.1%  0.3% 2.4%  0.9% 5.0%  3.6% 2.2% 
Non Durable   0.7%  0.3% 0.7%  0.7% 2.2%  2.7% 0.9% 
Energy  1.5%  2.8% 2.2%  1.3% 0.8% -0.6% 3.4% 
Total EMU -0.4%  0.3% 2.2%  1.3% 4.0%  3.3% 2.5% 
 
With regards to inflation, our forecasts have been revised upwards since our summer 
report, to 2.0% for 2007 and 2.2% for 2008. Practically all basic HICP components 
contribute to this upwards revision, except non energy industrial goods and services in 
2008. The inflation perspectives for non energy industrial goods had been progressively 
being revised downwards during the last four months, but with August figures, forecasts 
for 2007 and 2008 for these goods were revised upwards in such a way that for 2007 
they are now at the same rate as in our last report and for 2008 they are still slightly 
below. It is also worth mentioning the upwards revision experienced by processed food 
in our latest update. This component registered a monthly rate in August significantly 
above the usual rate for the month. 
 
Figure 4 Year-on-year inflation and confidence bands 
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Figure 4 shows the expected evolution of annual HICP growth rates in the next months. 
Inflation is expected to rise significantly at the end of the year, to values of 2.5%, 
mainly as the result of the forecast evolution of energy prices. Following a first quarter 
of 2008 at this rate, inflation is expected to return to values close to 2.0-2.2%. For the 
whole forecasting period we are expecting inflation to be above the average of the last 
ten years. 
 
Comparison with alternative forecasts 
The forecasts presented above were obtained from the EFN macroeconometric model. 
Its basic version is described in detail in the EFN Spring 2002 report. Table 5 shows a 
comparison of the EFN forecasts for the main macroeconomic aggregates with other 
forecasts, notably those of the European Commission, the IMF, the staff of the ECB, the 
OECD, and Consensus Economics Inc. 
The EFN numbers for 2007 are very close to those of the ECB, that have been published 
this month. For 2008, EFN is more pessimistic. With regards to GDP growth, this is 
basically because in our forecast, the investment upswing comes to an end this autumn; 
on the other hand, the positive swing of private consumption is more pronounced than 
in alternative forecasts. On inflation, there is quite a broad consensus at 2.0% for 2007 
and 2008, the EU and OECD forecasts being the most optimistic for 2007. For 2008, 
EFN forecast is the most pessimistic at 2.2%, and it is the only one that considers a rise 
in inflation in 2008. Regarding industrial production, EFN expects higher growth rates 
than Consensus. 
Table 5 Comparison of EFN forecasts with alternative forecasts 
  EFN EU IMF ECB OECD Consensus
  2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008
GDP 2.5 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.2 
Priv. Consumption 1.7 2.4 2.1 2.4 1.7 2.0 1.6 2.1 2.0 2.3 1.6 2.1 
Gov. Consumption 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.6 
Fixed Capital Form. 4.5 1.8 4.4 3.6 4.1 3.6 4.4 3.0 4.3 3.0 5.0 2.9 
Unemployment rate 7.0 6.7 7.3 6.9 7.3 7.1 na na 7.1 6.7 7.0 6.7 
HICP 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 
IP 3.3 2.5 na na 2.0 na na na na na 2.9 2.3 
EU: European Commission, European Economy, No. 2, 2007 (Spring); IMF: World Economic Outlook,  2007; ECB: ECB Monthly 
Bulletin, September 2007, OECD: Economic Outlook, No. 81, May 2007; Consensus: Consensus Economics Inc., Consensus 
Forecasts, September 2007. ECB figures correspond to their macroeconomic projections. Numbers in the table refer to the mean of 
the respective projected interval. 
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Variables of the world economy 
Assumptions concerning the evolution of important variables related to the state of the 
world economy are shown in Table 6 below. For the US, GDP growth will be below 
potential: clearly so in 2007 and still quite a bit in 2008. Japanese growth is assumed to 
slow in the coming quarters. Inflation in the US will recede slowly, while the price level 
in Japan will not rise before 2008. The oil price is assumed to recede somewhat from its 
present near-record level. We assume that the devaluation of the dollar relative to the 
euro comes to a halt. We forecast that world trade, that started sluggishly into 2007, will 
expand roughly at its trend rate in the second half of this year and in 2008. 
 
Table 6 Variables of the world economy 
  2007 2008 
US GDP Growth Rate 1.9 2.6 
US Consumer Price Inflation 2.8 2.4 
US Short Term Interest Rate 4.7 4.5 
US Long Term Interest Rate 4.8 5.0 
Japan GDP Growth Rate 2.4 2.1 
Japan Consumer Price Inflation 0.0 0.4 
Japan Short Term Interest Rate 0.7 1.3 
Japan Long Term Interest Rate 1.8 2.2 
World Trade 6.0 7.2 
Oil Price 68 70 
USD/Euro Exchange Rate 1.35 1.37 
100Yen/Euro Exchange Rate 1.60 1.55 
Apart from the development of world trade, long term interest rates and nominal exchange rates, all variables are 
exogenous to the EFN forecast, mostly taken from Consensus Economics (2007) and OECD (2006). US short term 
interest rate: 3 months government bills. Oil price (end of period) in US dollar per barrel (Brent), all other variables 
in percent. 
